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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
   ____________ 
 
HILLMAN, District Judge. 
 Edward S. Cohen appeals from the order of the New 
Jersey District Court affirming the bankruptcy judge's 
determination that certain debts were nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy because they were obtained by fraud, as defined in 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).  Because we conclude that section 
523(a)(2)(A) excludes punitive as well as compensatory damages 
from discharge, we will affirm. 
 I. 
 In 1985, appellant, Edward Cohen ("Cohen"), and his 
father, Nathan Cohen, purchased an 18-unit residential apartment 
building at 600 Monroe Street in Hoboken, New Jersey.  They held 
title to the Monroe Street property until December 1989.  The 
Cohens also owned several other residential properties: another 
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multi-family apartment building in Hoboken, one in Union City, 
two in Paterson, one in Jersey City and one in Newark.   
   The Hoboken Rent Leveling Act (The Act) is a 
comprehensive rent control ordinance which governed the Monroe 
Street property.  The rents set by the Cohens were approximately 
double what they could legally charge under the Act.  Most of the 
tenants in the Monroe Street units were non-native speakers of 
English with little education.  
 In 1989, the Hoboken Rent Control Administrator 
determined that the Cohens had violated the Act.  The Cohens were 
ordered to refund amounts totaling $31,382.50.  The amounts were 
not refunded and the Cohens failed to perfect an appeal from the 
determination of the Administrator.  Thereafter, the Cohens filed 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge these as well as 
other debts. 
 On February 14, 1991, the tenants filed an adversary 
proceeding against Edward Cohen in the bankruptcy court.  They 
claimed that the debts owed to them were procured by fraud and 
were thus nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(2)(A).  Additionally, each tenant sought a judgment for 
three times the amount of the refund pursuant to New Jersey's 
Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.Stat.Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to 8-9. 
 At trial, the plaintiffs testified that they had no 
knowledge of the legal amount of rent.  Most were unaware that 
any rent control ordinance governed the property.  Cohen admitted 
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that at the time he purchased the property, he was aware that the 
rent control ordinance existed.  He claimed, however, that he 
never inquired about the requirements of the ordinance nor was he 
advised of its provisions.  He testified that he was aware that 
he could not raise rents more than 6% per annum, but claimed to 
believe that he could charge new tenants any amount up to fair 
market value.  In fact, the Act limited the amount of rent the 
Cohens could charge existing and new tenants. 
 After hearing the testimony, the bankruptcy judge 
determined that the debts were nondischargeable and that the 
Consumer Fraud Act applied.  The court found that Cohen, despite 
being represented by counsel, recklessly made no effort to 
investigate the statute and selectively inquired about its 
application.  The court further found that Cohen conveniently 
understood that the ordinance allowed him to surcharge his 
tenants for increases in water bills and taxes and he knew where 
he could apply for such relief.  Cohen claimed, however, that he 
did not think to investigate how much he could charge new 
tenants.  Based on these facts, the bankruptcy court found that 
Cohen had selectively understood and applied the provisions of 
the ordinance that were to his benefit, but wilfully failed to 
ascertain the less advantageous provisions. On the basis of 
Cohen's admittedly selective understanding of the statute, the 
bankruptcy court concluded that he had committed fraud within the 
meaning of the bankruptcy code.  The court also held that Cohen's 
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conduct violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 56:8-1, and that Cohen was statutorily liable for treble 
damages.  The bankruptcy court held that the treble damage award 
also was nondischargeable in bankruptcy, and it entered a total 
judgment for $94,147.50.  The district court affirmed.  In re 
Cohen, 191 B.R. 599 (D.N.J. 1996).1 
 In his appeal, Cohen contends that the district court 
erred in affirming the order of the bankruptcy court.  First, he 
asserts that, in finding that appellant's conduct amounted to 
nondischargeable fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), the 
bankruptcy court and the district court applied incorrect 
principles of law and made clearly erroneous factual findings.  
Second, he argues that, even if his conduct amounted to fraud 
under the bankruptcy code, it did not constitute a violation of 
                     
     
1
 The district court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  Because the bankruptcy court 
first heard this case, Bankruptcy Rule 8013 governed the district 
court's standard of review: 
 
On an appeal the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel may 
affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's 
judgment, order or decree or remand with instructions 
for further proceedings.  Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to 
judge the credibility of witnesses. 
 
 Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d).  8013.  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's order, because a district court sits as an appellate 
court in bankruptcy court.  In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  We review the bankruptcy court's findings of fact 
for clear error.  Id.  We exercise plenary review over questions 
of law.  Id. 
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the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1.   
Third, he contends that the treble damage provision of the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act is a punitive damage award.  As such, 
Cohen contends that the treble damage portion of the debt is 
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).   
 We have carefully considered both the facts and the law 
and we find no error in the district court's conclusion that 
Cohen committed fraud within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and N.J. Stat. Ann § 56:8-1.  Both the bankruptcy 
court and the district court applied the correct principles of 
law, and the factual findings of the bankruptcy court were not 
clearly erroneous.  Because Cohen's objections to the bankruptcy 
court's findings of fraud raise no substantial questions not 
fully addressed by the courts below, we affirm without discussion 
the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy judge's 
findings of fraud under both the bankruptcy code and the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.   
 However, because the question of whether punitive 
damages2 are dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) is the 
subject of a split in the circuits, we will address that issue in 
full. 
 II. 
                     
     
2 We assume without deciding for purposes of this opinion that the treble damages 
provision of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-9 is purely punitive and does not serve a compensatory 
function.  But see Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 24, 647 A.2d 454, 465 (N.J. 1994) 
(suggesting that purpose of treble damage and attorney fee awards was partly compensatory). 
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 Section 523(a) of the federal bankruptcy statute 
provides limited exceptions to the general dischargeability of 
debts of eligible claimants under the statute.  Specifically, 
section 523(a) sets forth sixteen types of debts that are 
nondischargeable under the code.  The subsection at issue here -- 
523(a)(2)(A) -- originally excepted from discharge any debt "for 
obtaining money, property [or] services . .. by . . . actual 
fraud. . . ."  Federal courts interpreted this provision to 
include punitive as well as compensatory damages within the 
exception to discharge.  See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 51 F.R. 244, 
246 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983); In re Carpenter, 17 B.R. 563, 564 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).  Cf. Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank v. 
Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 Congress amended this provision in 1984, thereby giving 
rise to the issue we now address.  See Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-353, 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 333, 376.  We must determine whether 
punitive damages are nondischargeable under the second of these 
exceptions, which provides in relevant part: 
(a) A discharge under . . . this title does not 
discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt -- 
 
 . . . 
 
 (2) for money, property, services, or an 
extension, renewal or refinancing 
of credit, to the extent obtained 
by -- 
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 (A) false pretenses, a false 
representation, or actual 
fraud . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 A number of courts, including two courts of appeals, 
have interpreted this provision and have come to conflicting 
conclusions about its meaning.  Several courts, including the 
Court of Appeals, for the Ninth Circuit, have held that, by 
including the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in the 
exception, Congress intended to limit the exception strictly to 
compensatory damages for the actual amount caused by the fraud.  
Consequently, those courts have held that punitive damages for 
fraud are dischargeable, notwithstanding § 523(a)(2)(A).  See, 
e.g., In re Levy, 951 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1991), (the language of 
the statute suggests that the subsection limits 
nondischargeability to the amount of benefit to the debtor or 
loss to the creditor the act of fraud itself created); In re 
Auricchio, 196 B.R. 279, 289-90 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996); In re 
Bozzano, 173 B.R. 990, 998 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994); In re Suter, 
59 B.R. 944, 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).   
 Other courts, however, including the Eleventh Circuit, 
have concluded that the language of the statute is ambiguous and 
that, because Congress' intent in adding the language is not 
clear, all damages resulting from fraud, whether punitive or 
compensatory, are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).  See, 
e.g., In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, 677-81 (11th Cir. 1993); 
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In re Roberti, 201 B.R. 614, 622-23 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); In re 
Winters, 159 B.R. 789, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993); In re Manley, 
135 B.R. 137, 144-45 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992).  See also 3 
Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 523.08 at 523-52 n.27 (15th ed. 1996) 
("The phrase `to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud,' 
which was added to section 523 in 1984, should not be read to 
limit a finding of nondischargeability only to the compensatory 
aspects of a fraud judgment.").  Cf. In re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 
1048, 1051 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that, with respect to a 
fraudulently obtained extension of credit, the language "to the 
extent obtained by" had not altered the amount of debt made 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)).  See also 3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy. ¶ 523.08 at 523-52 n.27 (15th ed. 1996) (The phrase 
"to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud," which was added 
to section 523 in 1984, should not be read to limit a finding of 
nondischargeability only to the compensatory aspect of a fraud 
judgment.).   
 We find the careful analysis of the Eleventh Circuit to 
be more persuasive than that of the Ninth Circuit.  We conclude 
that the language "to the extent obtained by" was not intended by 
Congress to limit the amount of debt considered nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(2)(A).  We therefore hold that debts caused by 
fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) are nondischargeable in their 
entirety. 
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 A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute 
 Liability under state law for damages caused by fraud, 
whether punitive or compensatory, clearly represents a debt 
within the meaning of the bankruptcy code.  In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 
1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1994); In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 678.  
Under the Code, a "debt" is defined as "liability on a claim."  
11 U.S.C. § 101(12).  A "claim" is further defined as a "right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment . . . 
."  11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).  See In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 
678.  "A `right to payment' is `nothing more nor less than an 
enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives . . . to 
[be] serve[d] in imposing the obligation.'"  Id. (quoting 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 
559 (1990)). 
 Despite the broad sweep of this definition of "debt," 
courts have held that punitive damages resulting from fraud as 
defined by § 523(a)(2)(A) are nevertheless dischargeable because, 
by including in § 523(a)(2)(A) the language "to the extent 
obtained by," Congress intended "to limit the nondischargeable 
debt to the amount `obtained by actual fraud.'"  In re Levy, 951 
F.2d at 198 (quoting In re Ellwanger, 105 B.R. 551, 555 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir.  1989)).  In In re Levy, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that, because punitive damages "do not represent losses to the 
victim of fraud or increases in the wealth of the debtor who 
engages in fraud," they "`are not a debt for fraud.'"  Id. 
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(quoting In re McDonald, 73 B.R. 877, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1987)).   
 At the heart of the Ninth Circuit's analysis is an 
assumption that the words "to the extent obtained by" modify the 
word "debt."  We disagree with such a reading of the statute.   
 First, the word "debt" appears in the general section 
preceding all sixteen specific exceptions to dischargeability.  
In contrast, the words "to the extent obtained by" follow most 
directly after a listing of other nouns:  "money, property, 
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit."  It 
is most sensible and most in accord with general linguistic 
analysis to apply a modifying phrase to the nearest objects, in 
this case "money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, 
or refinance of credit." 
 In addition, it strains the structure of the statute as 
a whole to conclude that the definition of the word "debt," which 
applies to all sixteen exceptions to dischargeability and 
elsewhere in the bankruptcy code, is altered by language 
contained in the second of these exceptions, and that the meaning 
of the word "debt" is different only with respect to that single 
exception.  Indeed, one of the basic canons of statutory 
construction is "that identical terms within an Act bear the same 
meaning.  “Thus, Congress' expansive definition of `debt' applies 
to each subsection of § 523(a), absent clear intent to the 
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contrary."  In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 680 (citations 
omitted). 
 We conclude that Congress intended the language "to the 
extent obtained by" to modify not "debt," but "money, property, 
services, and extension . . . of credit."   This conclusion is 
reinforced when one analyzes the provision with specific 
attention to the items in the list other than "money" -- i.e., 
"property," "services" or "extension of credit."  It may at first 
blush appear plausible that Congress intended to limit some 
damage portion of the nondischargeable debt when one asks whether 
the debt in issue is a "debt . . . for money, . . . to the extent 
obtained by the fraud."  However, when one asks whether the debt 
is a "debt . . . for refinancing of credit, . . . to the extent 
obtained by the fraud," it is apparent that the meaning of "to 
the extent obtained by the fraud" is to distinguish between 
fraudulently and legally refinanced credit, not to limit the 
objectives being "serve[d] in imposing the obligation."  
Davenport, 495 U.S. at 559.  See In re Manley, 135 B.R. at 145.  
So understood, the language appears not to distinguish actual 
from punitive damages, but "contractual debts tainted with fraud 
from debts for mere breach of contract or `failure to pay.'"  In 
re Manley, 135 B.R. at 145. 
 In the instant case, Cohen obtained substantial sums in 
rent from plaintiffs, only $31,382.50 of which was obtained by 
fraud.  As a result, the amount of Cohen's debt for this 
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fraudulently-obtained sum is nondischargeable.  The dissent 
agrees with our analysis that "to the extent obtained by" 
modifies "money" not "debt."  It suggests, however, that the 
amount in excess of $31,382.50 awarded as treble damages was not 
obtained by fraud and therefore is not within the exception.  
However, the statutory language specifically states that the 
"debt for . . . money . . . to the extent obtained by . . . 
fraud" is not dischargeable.  One's debt for fraudulently 
obtained monies may and frequently does exceed the actual sum of 
the fraud.  For example, the debt normally includes interest, 
costs of recovery and attorney fees, as well as compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Under New Jersey law, one's debt for such 
fraudulently obtained monies includes three times the amount of 
the fraudulently obtained sum.  Nothing in the language "to the 
extent obtained by" requires distinguishing between the theories 
of recovery under which the debt is owed.    
 We therefore conclude that the language on its face 
does not clearly limit nondischargeable damages under § 
523(a)(2)(A) to compensatory damages only. 
 B. Legislative History 
 Where, as here, statutory meaning is at best unclear, 
we look to the legislative history to resolve any conflict.  See 
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 761 (1992) (stating that 
resort to statutory history is appropriate where language of 
statute is ambiguous or confusing).  "The normal rule of 
  
 
 14 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for 
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created 
concept, it makes that intent specific."  Kelly v. Robinson, 479 
U.S. 36, 47 (1986).  In particular, the Supreme Court has 
observed that a court should "not read the Bankruptcy Code to 
erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended such a departure."  Davenport, 495 U.S. at 563.  
 As the Tenth Circuit previously has observed about the 
1984 amendments, 
there is no reason to conclude that the 1984 
amendments were anything but 
technical and cosmetic.  We have 
found no legislative history 
reflecting that Congress intended 
to significantly alter the rights 
and obligations of creditors and 
debtors governed by this section . 
. . . 
 
In re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 1048, 1051 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that "to the extent obtained by" was not intended to limit the 
amount of nondischargeable credit extensions).  See also In re 
St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 680. 
 Prior to the 1984 bankruptcy amendments, the statute 
provided that a debtor was not entitled to a discharge of "any 
debt . . . for obtaining money, property, services, or an 
extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by . . . false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud . . . ."  The 
language change in 1984 merely struck "obtaining" preceding 
"money," and added "to the extent obtained" at the end of the 
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list of things which may be obtained by fraud.  In this 
historical context, the language seems a simple (though arguably 
less clear) rewording of the earlier phrasing.   
 Nothing in the 1978 version of the statute suggests 
that punitive damages for fraud should be distinguished from the 
compensatory portion of such debt.  Instead, under the 1978 
phrasing, subsection (2) of section 523(a) should be interpreted 
consistently with the other exceptions, which have been broadly 
construed to cover both punitive and compensatory portions of 
debt for culpable conduct, even by those courts that have 
rejected such a broad interpretation of the modified § 
523(a)(2)(A).  See, e.g., In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th 
Cir 1994) (punitive damages nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4)); 
In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1991) (punitive 
damages nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)).  In fact, prior to 
the 1984 amendments, courts had held that punitive damages as 
well as compensatory damages for fraud were nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(2).  See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 51 B.R. 244, 246 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983) ("Punitive damages awarded pursuant to 
state law for actions which would render a debt nondischargeable, 
see 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6), are nondischargeable 
in bankruptcy."); In re Carpenter, 17 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1982) (both compensatory and punitive damages 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2).  Cf. Birmingham Trust Nat. 
Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he plain 
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language of the statute suggests that dischargeability is an `all 
or nothing' proposition."). 
 The Supreme Court's dicta in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 
279, 282 n.2 (1991), is not to the contrary.  In Grogan, the 
Court specifically declined to address the question presently 
before us:  "whether § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge that 
part of a judgment in excess of the actual value of money or 
property received by a debtor by virtue of fraud."  Id.  While 
the Court recognized that such a proposition was "arguable," it 
expressly avoided deciding the issue.  The Court's mere 
acknowledgment of an arguable position not only is dicta, but 
also does not suggest any future direction of the Court.  As a 
practical matter, the Grogan Court actually reinstated a district 
court’s decision that a state court judgment for fraud, including 
punitive and compensatory damages, was nondischargeable under § 
523(a)(2)(A). 
 We therefore conclude from the legislative history that 
Congress intended with § 523(a)(2)(A) to create an exception for 
a type of debt caused by limited, culpable conduct.  Congress did 
not intend, however, that the amount of such debt or claim, 
including the theories of recovery for such conduct, was to be 
limited by the section. 
 C. Policy Considerations 
 Sound policy also supports our decision.  First, in the 
absence of the fraud that gave rise to the nondischargeable, 
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compensatory portion of the debt, there would be no liability for 
punitive damages.  "To discharge an ancillary debt which would 
not exist but for a nondischargeable debt seems erroneous."  In 
re Roberti, 201 B.R. at 623 (quoting In re Weinstein, 173 B.R. 
258, 273-75 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 Second, our result is consistent with the "fresh start" 
policy of the bankruptcy code.  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning [is 
limited] to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”   Grogan, 498 
U.S. at 286-87.  Where a debtor has committed fraud under the 
code, he is not entitled to the benefit of a policy of liberal 
construction against creditors.  Id.; Birmingham Trust, 755 F.2d 
at 1477.  Cf. In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 625 (3d Cir. 1990) 
("Although it is true that the bankruptcy laws were generally 
intended to give troubled debtors a chance, the 
nondischargeability exceptions reflect Congress' belief that 
debtors do not merit a fresh start to the extent that their debts 
fall within § 523."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1066 (1991).  We 
think it unlikely that Congress, in excepting fraud from 
dischargeability, "would have favored the interest in giving 
perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in 
protecting victims of fraud."  Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287. 
 Furthermore, the amount of actual damages in consumer 
fraud cases, although significant to the plaintiffs, is often not 
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large.  Without including treble damages in the nondischargeable 
debt, victims of fraud will have even greater difficulty 
obtaining competent legal representation to pursue adversarial 
actions in bankruptcy court and prevent fraudulent debtors from 
using the Bankruptcy Code to evade lawful state judgments. 
 Finally, we observe that our decision is consistent 
with the punitive damages at issue in this case.  Under New 
Jersey law, treble damages are statutorily mandated for every 
violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  See Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 647 A.2d 454, 465 (N.J. 1994).  As a result, the debtor is 
fully aware at the time of his commission of a fraud of the full 
amount of the "debt" he will owe on a determination that he has 
committed such fraud.  In this practical, additional sense, 
treble damages should be nondischargeable as an indistinguishable 
component of the debt owed. 
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 III. 
 For the above reasons, we conclude that punitive 
damages are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).  
Accordingly, the district court’s decision affirming the judgment 
of the bankruptcy court will be affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In re Cohen, No. 96-5155  
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Judge Hillman obviously has written a thoughtful 
opinion.  Nevertheless, I respectfully dissent insofar as the 
majority holds that the damages to the extent trebled are not 
dischargeable.  In this opinion I will treat the trebled portion 
of the damages as punitive damages in accordance with the 
majority opinion.   
 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) provides that a discharge 
"does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for money, 
property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of 
credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, [or] a false 
representation . . . ."  The initial issue on this appeal is thus 
whether "to the extent obtained" relates to "debt" or to "money, 
property, [or] services."  The majority holds that "to the extent 
obtained" refers to "money, property, [or] services" and I agree. 
 After all, it would be awkward to think that the debtor 
"obtained" a "debt," for what the debtor obtains is something of 
value, thus creating a debt.   
 But at that point I part company with the majority 
because treating "to the extent obtained" as referring to "money, 
property, [or] services," makes it clear to me that punitive 
damages are dischargeable, for the punitive damages do not 
reflect money, property, or services the debtor "obtained."  
Punitive damages are simply a penalty and are something a debtor 
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pays rather than obtains.  Here, Cohen "obtained" only the 
overcharges which are reflected in the compensatory damages which 
we all agree are not dischargeable. 
 Furthermore, if Congress intended that punitive damages 
under section 523(a)(2)(A) were to be non-dischargeable, as the 
majority holds, it seems to me that the statute simply would read 
that "A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt for false pretenses, [or] a false representation. . 
. ."  That formulation would be consistent with treating punitive 
damages as part of the debtor's "debt."  In other words, if 
punitive damages are not to be dischargeable, there is no need 
for the "money, property, services . . . to the extent obtained" 
provision in section 523(a)(2)(A).  I believe that we should not 
construe a statute so as to render portions of it superfluous. 
 Congress used the structure that I suggest would 
support the majority's result in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) which 
recites that "A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."  Thus, in a 
section 523(a)(4) case the exception to the discharge is not 
confined by a provision equivalent to the "money, property, 
services . . . to the extent obtained" provision in section 
523(a)(2).  There is a structure similar to section 523(a)(4) in 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) which provides that "A discharge . . . does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for willful and 
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malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the 
property of another entity."  It therefore follows that 
fiduciaries in the enumerated cases, embezzlers, thieves and 
persons who commit willful and malicious torts cannot obtain 
discharges of punitive damage awards.   
 Congress thus carefully distinguished the types of 
wrongdoing when it set forth the exceptions to a discharge.  I, 
like the majority, would honor that distinction by holding that 
"to the extent obtained" in section 523(a)(2) relates to "money, 
property [or] services" and not to "debt," but would go further 
and hold that the punitive damages simply are not "money, 
property, [or] services" as those three terms relate to something 
the debtor obtained.  Thus, punitive damages are dischargeable in 
cases coming within section 523(a)(2).  I point out that while I 
have reached my result through my own analysis, it is hardly 
innovative as I merely am taking the position taken by most other 
courts.  See In re Auricchio, 196 B.R. 279, 290 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1996).  ("Most courts have found that punitive damages awards are 
dischargeable under § 523(a)(2).") (collecting cases). 
 There is court of appeals support for my position for, 
as the majority points out, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has reached a result opposite to that the majority 
reaches today.  See In re Levy, 951 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965 (1992); see also In re 
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Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1994).  That court in 
Bugna explained the law as follows: 
 This plain reading of section 523(a)(4) is 
consistent with our interpretation of other 
subsections within section 523(a).  We have 
interpreted section 523(a)(6), which contains 
language similar to that in section 
523(a)(4), as barring discharge of punitive 
damages liability.  See In re Britton, 950 
F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Adams, 
761 F.2d 1422, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1985).  And, 
though we have said that section 523(a)(2) 
does not bar discharge of punitive damages, 
In re Levy, 951 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 
1991), that section is clearly 
distinguishable:  '[U]nlike sections 
523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6), [section 523(a)(2)] 
does not bar discharge of punitive damages.' 
 Id. at 198.  Congress specifically limited 
the application of section 523(a)(2) to 'debt 
. . . to the extent obtained by false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud.'  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (emphasis 
added).  Because punitive damages are not 
obtained by fraud but rather imposed because 
of it, they are not restitutionary as 
required under section 523(a)(2).  Levy, 951 
F.2d at 199.  Section 523(a)(4), like section 
523(a)(6), conspicuously lacks this limiting 
language. 
 
Bugna, 33 F.3d at 1058-59.  The majority criticizes the analysis 
in Levy because Levy presumes "that the words 'to the extent 
obtained by' modify the word 'debt'."  Majority typescript at 9. 
 While I agree that "to the extent obtained by" does not modify 
"debt," still it seems clear to me that the Court of the Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit correctly distinguished between section 
523(a)(2) on the one hand and sections 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) on 
the other. 
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 I believe my proposed result is consistent with the 
fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.  While the majority 
expresses concern that a debtor acting fraudulently will escape 
the consequences of his or her action, I think it is important to 
understand how broadly fraud has come to be defined.  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 1989) (definition of conduct wrongful 
under the Consumer Fraud Act).  Consider fraud under RICO.  As 
every federal judge knows, in RICO civil cases plaintiffs 
frequently allege mail fraud as the racketeering activity in 
situations in which no United States Attorney would seek a RICO 
indictment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).  In RICO cases, just as 
under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, treble damages are 
recoverable.  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  This case will come to be 
authority that the trebled portion of the damages in a civil RICO 
case are not dischargeable, even though the dispute leading to 
the judgment is essentially commercial, and the racketeering 
activity is mail fraud.   
 Indeed, in this case, while I have not dissented from 
the finding that Cohen committed fraud, his conduct was hardly 
shocking.  The district court described Cohen's conduct as 
follows:  "[Cohen] made an implicit representation regarding the 
rent he charged -- his silence coupled with the rental amount 
fixed constituted a representation that he was charging lawful 
rent."  In re Cohen, 191 B.R. 599, 605 (D.N.J. 1996).  
Furthermore, the finding of fraud was not predicated on Cohen's 
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actual knowledge.  Rather, as the district court explained, it 
was based on his reckless disregard of the truth. 
 I recognize that Cohen's situation is not one that can 
generate much sympathy.  He was, after all, a landlord dealing 
with persons whose primary language was Spanish and who had 
little education.  Id. at 602.  Nevertheless, if "an implicit 
representation" can give rise to a non-dischargeable punitive 
damages judgment, in some cases poor or uneducated people may 
feel the thrust of our opinion as such persons may make "implicit 
representation[s]" just as Cohen did.  The majority's opinion may 
come to haunt such people seeking to make a fresh start. 
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